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COLLATERAL DAMAGE:  
WHEN SHOULD THE DETERMINATIONS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS HAVE 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT IN 
SUBSEQUENT ADJUDICATIONS? 
Matthew Faust* 
 
Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine under which a court gives 
issue-preclusive effect to findings of fact or law made in previous 
proceedings.  The U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that under certain 
circumstances, the determinations of administrative adjudications have 
collateral estoppel effect in federal court.  The Court, however, did not 
address under which circumstances the determinations of administrative 
adjudications should have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent 
administrative adjudications.  There has been little clear and consistent 
reasoning in lower federal courts about when collateral estoppel should 
apply in administrative adjudications, and administrative agencies vary 
widely in their application of collateral estoppel when conducting 
adjudications. 
This Note argues that neither the balancing test used to apply collateral 
estoppel in federal court nor the more formalistic per se rules proposed by 
some commentators are appropriate when applying collateral estoppel 
between administrative adjudications.  Instead, courts should defer to 
agencies, granting them wide discretion to recognize or not recognize the 
collateral estoppel effect of prior administrative adjudications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mohammad Hassan Amrollah-Majdabadi (“Amrollah”) was an Iranian 
pharmacist.1  After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, he resented the 
 
 1. Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 2013). 
2016] ADMINISTRATIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 2881 
repressiveness of the new regime.2  In addition to participating in 
antigovernment protests, he began to provide medical supplies and money 
to an opposition group known as the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq3 (MeK).  The 
MeK had initially supported the Iranian Revolution of 1979, but had 
quickly turned against the new government.4  The Iranian government 
repeatedly prosecuted Amrollah throughout the 1980s and 90s for his 
suspected support of the MeK.5 
In 1998, Amrollah received a subpoena to appear before the Iranian 
religious authorities.6  Fearing for his life, he and his family fled Iran for the 
United States.7  After illegally entering the United States, Amrollah applied 
for asylum.8  The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service 
(USCIS) immigration judge who heard Amrollah’s application decided that, 
despite Amrollah’s involvement with the MeK, his actions had not 
constituted terrorist activity, and he ruled that Amrollah and his family were 
eligible for asylum.9 
Amrollah changed his first name to Tom, and he and his family applied 
for permanent residency status in the United States.10  After a long delay, 
his application for permanent residency was denied.11  USCIS had 
reconsidered its earlier determination in the asylum proceeding and decided 
that Amrollah’s involvement with the MeK did, in fact, constitute terrorist 
activity.12  Amrollah appealed the agency’s decision, and after losing in 
federal district court, he appealed again to the Fifth Circuit.13 
Amrollah argued that, because the issue of whether he had engaged in 
terrorism had been litigated and decided during his asylum hearing, USCIS 
was collaterally estopped from revisiting the issue in a subsequent 
adjudication.14  The Fifth Circuit agreed, reversed the district court, and 
granted summary judgment for Amrollah.15  The application was remanded 
 
 2. Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Amrollah, 710 F.3d 568 (No. 12-50357). 
 3. Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 570.  The MeK, or People’s Mujahadeen of Iran, is a 
controversial Iranian opposition group with a Marxist-Islamist ideology. Jonathan Masters, 
Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 28, 2014), http://www. 
cfr.org/iran/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek/p9158 [https://perma.cc/W7L8-FJYB].  The MeK has 
been accused of violence against both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the previous Iranian 
regime under the Shah. Id. 
 4. Masters, supra note 3. 
 5. Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 570. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  Amrollah applied for permanent residency in 1999 and his application was 
denied in 2009. Id. 
 12. Id.  In 2002, the U.S. State Department listed the MeK as a terrorist organization, 
and in 2003 the MeK fought alongside Saddam Hussein’s forces in resisting the United 
States invasion of Iraq. Masters, supra note 3. 
 13. Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 570.  Amrollah appealed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706. Id.  
Chapter Seven of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) allows for judicial review of 
decisions made by administrative agencies. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012). 
 14. See Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 571. 
 15. Id. at 573. 
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back to USCIS, which had no choice but to grant Amrollah permanent 
resident status.16 
In holding that USCIS could not relitigate issues of fact or law already 
decided in a prior adjudication, the court relied on the common law doctrine 
of collateral estoppel (sometimes called “issue preclusion”).17  The 
principle that the determinations of administrative adjudications, as well as 
court cases, can collaterally estop parties in subsequent proceedings has 
been developed by the U.S. Supreme Court over the last fifty years.18  The 
Court’s recent decision in B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.19 
finally established a test for determining when an administrative 
determination will have collateral estoppel effect in federal court.20 
B & B Hardware, however, did not address the question that was raised 
in Amrollah v. Napolitano21:  What is the collateral estoppel effect of an 
administrative adjudication on subsequent administrative adjudications?  
This Note explores the difficulties that agencies and federal courts have 
encountered when applying collateral estoppel from the findings of one 
administrative adjudication in another administrative adjudication.  Part I 
summarizes the doctrine of collateral estoppel before describing the analytic 
framework the Supreme Court has constructed for determining whether 
agency determinations have collateral estoppel effect in federal court.  Part 
II examines situations in which courts and agencies have had to determine 
the collateral estoppel effect of a prior agency decision on a subsequent 
adjudication by the same agency or another agency with overlapping 
jurisdiction.  It examines a range of cases to show that courts have failed to 
provide clear guidance or resolve the tensions between collateral estoppel 
and administrative law.  Part III discusses possible solutions, including 
whether the Court’s current collateral estoppel framework can be expanded 
to encompass administrative adjudications and whether courts should adopt 
a set of per se rules governing when an agency’s decision has collateral 
estoppel effect in subsequent adjudications.  Finally, Part IV argues that, 
given the complexities of agency adjudications and the broad discretion 
federal agencies enjoy, agencies should be allowed to determine whether to 
rely on collateral estoppel on a case-by-case basis. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT 
In order to understand the problems that arise when applying collateral 
estoppel in administrative adjudications, it is first necessary to understand 
the four-factor analysis that federal courts use to decide whether collateral 
estoppel applies.  Then, it is necessary to understand how this basic analysis 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. at 571–73. 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
 19. 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 20. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 21. 710 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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has been modified and applied by the Supreme Court when determining the 
collateral estoppel effect of agency determinations. 
Part I.A describes the factors that courts normally consider when 
applying collateral estoppel, as well as the policy considerations that caused 
the courts gradually to expand the use of issue preclusion.  Part I.B traces 
the evolution of the Court’s reasoning on the collateral estoppel effect of 
administrative adjudications, starting with United States v. Utah 
Construction & Mining Co.,22 through University of Tennessee v. Elliot23 
and Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino,24 culminating with 
the Court’s recent decision in B & B Hardware, in which the Court 
attempted to synthesize the reasoning from its earlier cases into a two-step 
analysis. 
A.  Collateral Estoppel Effect 
of Judicial Determinations in Federal Court 
Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine under which a court gives 
preclusive effect to findings of fact or law made in previous proceedings.25  
In determining whether to apply collateral estoppel, courts generally rely on 
a four-factor test:  First, is the issue identical to the issue in the previous 
proceeding?  Second, was the issue necessary to the judgment in the 
previous proceeding?  Third, was the issue fully and fairly litigated?  And 
finally, did the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted 
have the opportunity to contest the issue?26  Courts have broad discretion in 
deciding how much weight to give each factor in the administrative 
context.27  Courts balance the interests of justice against the underlying 
 
 22. 384 U.S. 394 (1966). 
 23. 478 U.S. 788 (1986). 
 24. 501 U.S. 104 (1991). 
 25. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979) (explaining the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 
525 (1931); United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 241–42 (1924) (extending collateral 
estoppel to matters of law when the parties are identical); Cromwell v. Cty. of Sacramento, 
94 U.S. 351, 354 (1877) (establishing collateral estoppel). See generally Austin Wakeman 
Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942).  Scott relies heavily on 
Cromwell, distinguishing collateral estoppel from the related doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 
3–4.  Res judicata precludes the relitigation of claims, whereas collateral estoppel precludes 
the relitigation of the individual issues collateral to those claims. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 493 (1982) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing that the issue must be identical for collateral estoppel to apply); 
Montana, 440 U.S at 153 (holding that the issue must be identical and have been necessary 
to prior judgment, and the party against whom estoppel is asserted must have exercised some 
control over the litigation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 
1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final 
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive 
in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”); see 
also Brian Levine, Note, Preclusion Confusion:  A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the 
Application of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, 1999 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 435, 439. 
 27. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1995); Facchiano v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, 859 F.2d 1163, 1167 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that collateral estoppel should be applied 
flexibly in the administrative context). 
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policy goal of collateral estoppel, which is to provide finality between 
parties on the disputed issue.28 
Since the start of the twentieth century, courts have become increasingly 
willing to allow the use of collateral estoppel.29  Initially, collateral estoppel 
only applied when both parties were identical or, at the very least, in privity 
with one another.30  In addition to this “mutual” collateral estoppel, courts 
allowed “non-mutual” collateral estoppel, satisfied only where the party 
who is to be estopped was privy to the previous proceeding.31  This 
liberalization also has extended collateral estoppel effect to “nontraditional” 
proceedings, such as arbitrations and administrative adjudications.32 
B.  The Collateral Estoppel Effect 
of Administrative Determinations in Federal Court 
The expansion of the application of collateral estoppel gradually came to 
encompass administrative as well as judicial decisions.33  Beginning in 
1966, the Court developed a line of cases that suggested administrative 
adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent cases in 
federal court and then defined under which circumstances an agency’s 
decision could have issue preclusive effect.34 
Part I.B.1 examines the Utah Construction decision and the Court’s 
suggestion that administrative decisions could have collateral estoppel 
effect.  Then Part I.B.2 analyzes how the Court began to develop specific 
guidelines for the application of collateral estoppel in subsequent cases.  
Lastly, Part I.B.3 discusses the Court’s recent decision in B & B Hardware, 
which finally outlined a clear test to determine when administrative agency 
decisions have collateral estoppel effect in federal court. 
 
 28. See, e.g., Montana, 440 U.S. at 153–54 (“To preclude parties from contesting 
matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries 
from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and 
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”); 
Scott, supra note 25, at 2. 
 29. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971) 
(noting “mutations in estoppel doctrine” including an “expansion” of the use of collateral 
estoppel that “enhanc[ed] the capabilities of the courts to deal with some issues swiftly but 
fairly”). 
 30. Id. at 322, 326–27. 
 31. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327–29 (1979); Blonder-Tongue, 
402 U.S. at 329. 
 32. See, e.g., David A. Brown, Note, Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative 
Agency Determinations:  Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 817, 826–28 (1988); Levine, supra note 26, at 440–41; infra Part I.B. 
 33. See Brown, supra note 32, at 817; Eric N. Macey, Note, The Collateral Estoppel 
Effect of Administrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
65, 66 (1977). 
 34. See infra Part I.B.1–2. 
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1.  The Utah Construction Decision 
The Court first suggested that administrative decisions could have 
collateral estoppel effect in federal court in Utah Construction.35  The case 
was a dispute between the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and a private 
contractor in which the contractor claimed breach of contract.36  Under the 
contract, an administrative panel adjudicated disputes between the parties 
regarding how the contract would be performed.37  When Utah 
Construction asked for additional time and money to complete the project 
due to changed conditions and incomplete government specifications,38 the 
AEC’s Advisory Board of Contract Appeals (“the Board”) denied the 
company’s claim after an administrative hearing.39  The Board drew its 
authority from the Wunderlich Act,40 which authorized the resolution of 
government contract disputes in administrative proceedings.41  In denying 
Utah Construction’s claims, the Board made the factual determination that 
changed conditions were not the cause of the delays and that, in any event, 
Utah Construction had not borne the cost of the delays.42 
Utah Construction responded by filing suit in the Court of Claims.43  The 
Court of Claims determined that the Board had exceeded its authority under 
the contract, as it was authorized only to resolve minor disputes, not settle 
actions for breach of contract.44  The Court of Claims granted trial de novo 
on Utah Construction’s claims.45  The Government appealed the decision to 
the Supreme Court.46  The Court reversed the grant of a trial de novo, 
holding that, while the Board could not settle a breach of contract claim, the 
Court of Claims had to respect the Board’s factual findings.47 
Justice White, writing for the Court, said in dicta that, while the Court’s 
decision was fully justified by the contractual terms as modified by the 
relevant statute, it was also “harmonious with [the] general principles of 
collateral estoppel.”48  Justice White noted that the Board was acting in its 
judicial capacity, the parties had had a fair opportunity to litigate the issue, 
and the determination of the issue had been necessary to the Board’s 
 
 35. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421–22 (1966). 
 36. Id. at 400–01. 
 37. Id. at 396–99. 
 38. Id. at 400–01. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 41 U.S.C. § 7107 (2012). 
 41. Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 418–19. 
 42. Id. at 400. 
 43. The U.S. Court of Claims is a federal court established under Article I of the 
Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012).  It has jurisdiction over claims against the 
United States stemming from, among other things, breaches of contract. See id. § 1491(a)(1). 
 44. Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 401. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 420. 
 48. Id. at 421. 
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judgment.49  Thus, the common law prerequisites for applying collateral 
estoppel were satisfied by the Board’s decision.50 
Although the Utah Construction opinion indicated the Court’s sympathy 
for the claim that administrative decisions could be given collateral estoppel 
effect, it stopped short of stating that collateral estoppel could have served 
as an independent basis for the Court’s decision.51  Many commentators, 
and some lower courts, concluded from Utah Construction that 
administrative adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in federal 
court.52  The extent to which this applied, and exactly which agencies’ 
rulings were entitled to collateral estoppel effect, remained uncertain.53 
2.  Evolution of the Administrative 
Collateral Estoppel in Federal Courts 
If the extent to which agency determinations had preclusive effect in 
federal courts was uncertain, the extent to which the administrative 
decisions of one agency bound another was even less certain.54  Whereas 
applying collateral estoppel from agency decisions in federal court required 
the comparison of one agency’s procedures and functions to those of the 
court,55 this analysis was further complicated when it required that one 
agency be compared to another agency.  For instance, if agencies had 
different mandates and areas of expertise, was collateral estoppel 
appropriate?56  How should courts treat the myriad of procedurally diverse 
adjudications administrative agencies conduct?57 
The Court began to provide clarification in University of Tennessee v. 
Elliot.  In that case, the Court had to determine the preclusive effect of a 
 
 49. Id. at 422. 
 50. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 51. Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 421 (“[T]he decision here rests upon the agreement of the 
parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act . . . .”). 
 52. See, e.g., Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137, 143–44 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting that an 
administrative ruling would have a preclusive effect on an issue before the court); Brown, 
supra note 32, at 826–27 (“In light of the modern expansion in administrative adjudicatory 
authority . . . courts have recognized that the extension of collateral estoppel to agency 
determinations can advance the goals behind the doctrine without increasing the risk of 
unfairness to the precluded litigants.”); Case Comment, Administrative Collateral Estoppel:  
The Case of the Subpoenas, 87 YALE L.J. 1247, 1251 (1978) [hereinafter Subpoenas] 
(“Supreme Court decisions now establish that the collateral estoppel principle is available to 
litigants in the burgeoning field of administrative adjudication.”). 
 53. See Brown, supra note 32, at 819. 
 54. See Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1986); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 
F.2d 862, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (questioning whether the FTC’s 
decisions could be given preclusive effect against another agency). But see Subpoenas, supra 
note 52, at 1252 (“Taken together with the Court’s decision in Sunshine [Anthracite Coal 
Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940)], Utah Construction binds one agency to the 
administrative adjudications of another.”). 
 55. See Brown, supra note 32, at 818–19. 
 56. Compare Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(dismissing argument that the FTC was estopped from bringing an enforcement action 
because of a prior Post Office decision), with Kramer, 803 F.2d at 901 (suggesting that the 
Constitution may require agencies to recognize one another’s decisions). 
 57. See infra Part III.A.1–2. 
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state agency proceeding on issues in a federal discrimination suit.58  The 
Court began its analysis by examining the provisions of Title VII59 under 
which the federal claims had been brought.60  Title VII required the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to give “substantial 
weight”61 to state or local authorities’ determinations.  The Court concluded 
that, had the complaint been filed with the EEOC and not in federal court, 
the EEOC would have had to consider the state agency’s position but not 
give it preclusive effect.62  Holding that what did not bind a federal agency 
could not bind a federal court, the Court rejected the university’s invocation 
of collateral estoppel based on the state agency adjudication.63 
Though the Court confirmed that agency determinations were entitled to 
collateral estoppel effect in federal court when the agency acted in a 
“judicial capacity,”64 the decision was, like Utah Construction, based on 
narrow statutory grounds that were not widely applicable in other 
contexts.65  Furthermore, the involvement of federalism issues complicated 
the Court’s analysis of collateral estoppel.66 
The Court returned to the issue of collateral estoppel in Astoria.  Astoria 
involved an age discrimination complaint that originally had been filed with 
the EEOC, but was referred to a New York state agency under a work 
sharing agreement.67  The state agency denied Angelo Solimino’s claim, 
and he subsequently filed a complaint in federal court.68  The federal 
district court granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion, citing the 
collateral estoppel effect of the state agency’s determinations of fact and 
law.69  The Second Circuit reversed the district court on the grounds that 
collateral estoppel was not appropriate in the circumstances of the case.70 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s reversal, holding that 
there was a presumption that administrative agencies’ determinations were 
entitled to collateral estoppel effect when they acted in a “judicial 
 
 58. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986). 
 59. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 60. Elliot, 478 U.S. at 795. 
 61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5b (2012). 
 62. Elliot, 478 U.S. at 795–96. 
 63. Id. at 796. 
 64. Id. at 797. 
 65. Id. at 795 (noting that “it would make little sense for Congress to write such a 
provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in 
federal court”). 
 66. See id. at 794.  The Court held that it was bound to give the state agency decisions 
the same effect in federal court as they had in state court. Id. at 799. 
 67. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 106 (1991). 
 68. Id. at 106–07. 
 69. Id. at 107.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Astoria Federal 
Savings and Loan rather than dismissing Solimino’s claims, making the case one of the 
application of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata. Solimino v. Astoria Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 715 F. Supp. 42, 46–47 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).  The district court credited the state 
agency’s findings of fact and law rather than its final decision on the claim. Id. at 47; see, 
e.g., Scott, supra note 25, at 2–3 (distinguishing res judicata from collateral estoppel). 
 70. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 107. 
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capacity.”71  However, this was a “lenient presumption”72 that could be 
overcome by an explicit or implied indication that Congress had not 
intended an agency’s determinations to have collateral estoppel effect.73  In 
Astoria, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act74 (ADEA), which was 
the basis of Solimino’s claim, required the filing of a claim with the state 
agency before filing in federal court.75  The Court reasoned that, if 
collateral estoppel were applied, it would effectively make it impossible to 
pursue ADEA claims in federal court.76  As Congress had clearly 
contemplated the availability of federal remedies in the ADEA, the Court 
concluded that the state agency’s decision could not have collateral estoppel 
effect.77 
Despite not granting collateral estoppel effect to the agency 
determination, Astoria’s reasoning actually strengthened the case for the 
courts to find that administrative adjudications had collateral estoppel 
effect.78  Before Astoria, courts could still plausibly claim that according an 
agency determination collateral estoppel effect was entirely within a court’s 
discretion.79  After Astoria, however, the lower courts had to recognize the 
presumption that agencies were authorized to make adjudicative 
determinations with collateral estoppel effect.80  The reasoning of the case 
also differed from Utah Construction in that it did not rest its analysis on 
the equitable factors of common law that Justice White cited as making 
collateral estoppel appropriate in the administrative context,81 but instead 
relied on legislative intent and statutory structure.82  Petitioners could now 
argue that, not only could the courts give collateral estoppel effect to 
administrative determinations, but that they were required to by statute.83 
 
 71. Id. at 108. 
 72. Id. at 112. 
 73. Id. at 108. 
 74. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012). 
 75. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 110–11. 
 76. Id. at 110. 
 77. Id. at 112–13. 
 78. See, e.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303–05 
(2015) (citing Astoria as endorsing collateral estoppel from administrative adjudications). 
 79. See id. at 1310 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court today applies a presumption that 
when Congress enacts statutes authorizing administrative agencies to resolve disputes in an 
adjudicatory setting, it intends those agency decisions to have preclusive effect in Article III 
courts.  That presumption was first announced in poorly supported dictum in a 1991 decision 
of this Court . . . .”). 
 80. See, e.g., Tice v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 325 F. App’x 114, 117 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(affirming the collateral estoppel effect of an agency decision); Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 
F.3d 382, 387 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Astoria for the proposition that “Congress may be 
presumed, when enacting a statute granting to an agency adjudicatory authority, to mandate 
adherence to the doctrine of collateral estoppel”). But see B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 
1311 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Astoria’s presumption in favor of collateral 
estoppel was mere dicta). 
 81. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 82. See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 83. See id. 
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3.  B & B Hardware’s Two-Step Analysis 
These different collateral estoppel analyses were united by the Supreme 
Court in B & B Hardware.  In B & B Hardware, Hargis Industries had 
attempted to register a trademark with the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board (TTAB), but was successfully opposed by B & B Hardware, which 
already was using a similar trademark.84  While the case was in front of the 
TTAB, B & B Hardware filed a trademark infringement claim against 
Hargis in federal court.85  After the TTAB decision in favor of B & B 
Hardware, B & B Hardware claimed that Hargis was estopped from 
launching a collateral attack on the TTAB decision in federal court.86  The 
district court rejected the assertion of collateral estoppel, and the case was 
eventually appealed to the Supreme Court.87 
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, applied a two-step process to 
determine whether collateral estoppel prevented Hargis from bringing the 
suit.88  First, citing Astoria, Justice Alito determined that there was nothing 
in the statutory scheme that could overcome the presumption that the TTAB 
was acting in its judicial capacity and that its determinations were entitled 
to have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent proceedings.89  Second, the 
Court applied the common law collateral estoppel factors, citing the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments.90  The Court held that Hargis—the 
party against whom estoppel was asserted—had had a fair chance to litigate 
the issue before the TTAB,91 the issue before the TTAB was essentially the 
same issue that arose in the subsequent suit,92 and the issue was explicitly 
decided in the TTAB decision.93  The Court, therefore, determined that the 
TTAB decision was entitled to collateral estoppel effect in the subsequent 
litigation.94 
The line of cases from Utah Construction through B & B Hardware 
created a template for deciding when an administrative adjudication should 
be accorded collateral estoppel effect in federal court.  Utah Construction 
suggested that the common law collateral estoppel analysis could be applied 
to administrative decisions.95  Elliot and Astoria established that, when 
Congress has authorized an agency to adjudicate, its determinations have a 
presumptively preclusive effect in federal court.96  Finally, B & B 
 
 84. Id. at 1299. 
 85. Id. at 1302. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1305–07. 
 89. Id. at 1303. 
 90. Id. at 1306 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 
1982)). 
 91. Id. at 1309. 
 92. Id. at 1306–07. 
 93. Id. at 1307. 
 94. Id. at 1310. 
 95. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); Univ. of 
Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986); supra Part I.B.2. 
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Hardware consolidated these principles into a two-step analysis:  First, the 
agency must be acting in its “judicial capacity,”97 and there can be nothing 
in its statutory scheme that states or implies that Congress did not intend its 
determinations to have issue-preclusive effect.98  Second, the application of 
collateral estoppel has to be equitable under a common law analysis.99  
Though certainly not immune from criticism,100 this framework provides 
reasonably clear criteria under which courts can decide when to apply 
collateral estoppel from administrative adjudications in federal court. 
II.  COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AMONG ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
The architecture of the modern administrative state often requires 
agencies to conduct parallel, recurring, or overlapping adjudications,101 
meaning that the same party can be subject to proceedings concerning the 
same set of facts more than once.  This raises the risk of inconsistent agency 
determinations, creates the possibility of repetitive or vexatious litigation, 
and promotes the general inefficiency of conducting multiple fact findings 
on the same issue.102  These are the same basic concerns that have driven 
the adoption of collateral estoppel by the courts.103 
B & B Hardware creates a template for courts to apply collateral estoppel 
from an administrative adjudication to a federal court proceeding, but it 
does not address how to apply collateral estoppel from one agency decision 
to another.104  Applying collateral estoppel across or within agencies 
increases the complexity of the common law collateral estoppel analysis 
and raises a host of concerns that are absent from the comparatively 
straightforward process of applying agency decisions in court.105  Part II.A 
examines the conflicting guidance courts have given when determining the 
collateral estoppel effect of agencies’ prior adjudications.  Part II.B 
analyzes the myriad ways that agencies themselves have applied collateral 
estoppel in their adjudications. 
 
 97. See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1303 (citing Elliot, 478 U.S. at 797). 
 98. See id. (citing Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108). 
 99. See id. at 1306–10 (analyzing the TTAB’s decision under the common law standard 
for applying collateral estoppel). 
 100. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 819, 851 (asserting the need for stricter, more 
formal requirements). 
 101. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1134–35 (2012) (discussing the increased overlap of jurisdiction 
between agencies); Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street:  The New 
Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689, 711 (2013) (analyzing the overlapping 
jurisdictions of newly created financial regulatory agencies). 
 102. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1145–46 (enumerating the potential 
conflicts and inefficiencies of concurrent agency jurisdiction). 
 103. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979) (“To preclude 
parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, 
conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the 
possibility of inconsistent decisions.”). 
 104. See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1303.  The Court’s decision only addressed 
situations “where a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency.” Id. 
 105. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Application of Collateral Estoppel by the Courts 
This section examines two questions that regularly arise when parties 
assert that administrative adjudications have collateral estoppel effect in 
subsequent administrative adjudications.  First, what collateral estoppel 
effect should an agency give to its own prior adjudications on the same 
issue?  Second, what collateral estoppel effect should an agency give the 
determinations of other agencies?  Part II.A.1 examines the conflicting 
guidance courts have given when determining the collateral estoppel effect 
of an agency’s own prior adjudications.  Part II.A.2 discusses the lack of a 
clear standard for courts to use when applying collateral estoppel between 
different agencies’ adjudications. 
1.  Concurrent and Recurring Adjudications by the Same Agency 
The first situation that requires the courts to determine the degree to 
which an agency should or can recognize the collateral estoppel effects of 
its own decisions occurs when a single event triggers more than one 
adjudication by the same agency.106  The adjudications can occur 
simultaneously or successively, either by chance or by design, as part of a 
multi-step process.107 
While this situation arises in a variety of administrative agencies,108 it 
commonly occurs in the context of immigration status decisions made by 
USCIS (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)).109  
This is partly due to the sheer number of determinations that USCIS is 
asked to make110 and partly due to the parallel and repetitive filings 
required by the regulatory scheme.111  For instance, a prospective 
immigrant may have to apply for an entry visa, a work permit, and a green 
card.112  The requests to obtain these documents can be filed simultaneously 
or successively, and the order in which determinations are made on each 
request depends largelyon processing times rather than any prerequisite that 
 
 106. See, e.g., Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 570–71 (2013) (noting that illegal 
entry into the United States required asylum hearings and permanent residency decisions for 
Amrollah, his wife, and his children). 
 107. See, e.g., id. at 571 (granting of asylum was a precondition for a hearing on 
permanent residency status); Adjustment of Status to That of Person Admitted for Permanent 
Residence, 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(a) (2015) (allowing adjustment of status to be filed before visa 
has been granted, so the two determinations may be made simultaneously or successively). 
 108. See, e.g., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Saulsberry, 887 F.2d 667, 668 (6th 
Cir. 1989) (examining an assertion of collateral estoppel within the Department of Labor); 
Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 185 (6th Cir. 1986) (examining an assertion of collateral 
estoppel within the Environmental Protection Agency). 
 109. See infra note 115 (providing examples of immigration cases involving multiple 
adjudications). 
 110. USCIS receives approximately six million petitions every year. Immigration and 
Citizenship Data, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-
studies/immigration-forms-data (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/78Y7-FXET]. 
 111. In this Note, “regulatory scheme” refers to the decisional procedures and standards 
created by the agency.  This is distinct from the “statutory scheme,” which refers to the 
procedures required by Congress. 
 112. See generally Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1101–1299 (2015). 
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one must be obtained before another.113  Once obtained, these documents 
must regularly be renewed.114  Many of these decisions require the 
consideration of the same facts and legal issues, leading parties to assert 
collateral estoppel.115 
The second situation in which agencies are asked to apply the collateral 
estoppel effect of an agency decision in that agency’s subsequent 
adjudications is when a regulatory agency, such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) or Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
revisits its decision concerning the permissibility of an activity.  For 
instance, the SEC may reexamine the same type of financial transaction116 
or the EPA may regulate the same industrial activity repeatedly.117 
If, for whatever reason, the agency refuses to recognize collateral 
estoppel from the prior adjudication, the parties may ask that the agency’s 
collateral estoppel decision be reviewed in federal court.118  Some of the 
usual collateral estoppel considerations are moot in intra-agency collateral 
estoppel, so courts use a modified test.119  In deciding whether to enforce 
collateral estoppel in intra-agency decisions, courts consider whether the 
issue was fully litigated,120 whether the issue is identical in both 
 
 113. A person who is physically in the United States may file for adjustment of status 
before their visa has been approved. Adjustment of Status to That of Person Admitted for 
Permanent Residence, 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(a) (2015). 
 114. See, e.g., Conditional Basis of Lawful Permanent Residence Status, 8 C.F.R. § 1216 
(2015). 
 115. See, e.g., In re Petitioner [Identifying Information Redacted], 2015 WL 4385367, at 
*9 (USCIS June 23, 2015) (dismissing the petitioner’s collateral estoppel argument based on 
an earlier determination in a multistep immigration proceeding); see also Mugomoke v. 
Hazuda, No. 13-cv-00984-KJM-KJN, 2014 WL 4472743, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2014) 
(analyzing an assertion of collateral estoppel from prior decisions in multistage asylum 
process). 
 116. See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 101 F.3d 1450, 1463–64 (2d Cir. 1996) (allowing 
the SEC to reexamine the legality of a type of transaction that it had previously allowed). 
 117. See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 185 (6th Cir. 1986) (allowing the EPA 
to impose higher emissions standards than it had previously required). 
 118. See supra note 13.  Agency decisions are also reviewable on constitutional due 
process grounds. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
 119. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining collateral estoppel factors).  
Agencies must state the reasons for their judgments and are in privity with themselves and 
other government agencies, so these two factors are not generally disputed. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 557(c) (2012) (requiring agencies subject to the APA to state the reasons for their 
conclusions); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–03 (1940) 
(holding that government officers are in privity with one another for collateral estoppel 
purposes); United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding 
federal agencies are in privity with one another). 
 120. See Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[Collateral estoppel] 
will not preclude relitigation of the issue when there is a substantial difference in the 
procedures employed by the prior and current tribunals.”); City of Pompano Beach v. Fed. 
Aviation Admin., 774 F.2d 1529, 1538 n.10 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that the “agency 
proceeding . . . does not meet the test that the parties were afforded a full opportunity to 
litigate”); Mugomoke, 2014 WL 4472743, at *8–9 (holding that an asylum interview was not 
a proceeding that could form the basis of collateral estoppel). 
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proceedings,121 and whether a change of fact or law occurred between the 
proceedings that would justify a different outcome.122 
Courts have considered both the depth and purpose of proceedings in 
determining their collateral estoppel value.123  For instance, a determination 
made in an initial asylum interview does not have preclusive effect on 
subsequent immigration proceedings seeking permanent residency.124  Due 
to the vast variety of formal and informal agency adjudications, an 
emphasis on this factor may weigh against the application of collateral 
estoppel.125  By contrast, when courts consider the collateral estoppel effect 
of an agency’s own determination, they are likely to determine that the 
underlying issues are identical.126  Agency adjudications, as creatures of 
statute, have limited subject matter jurisdictions, and the same legal or 
factual determination that is dispositive in one agency adjudication is often 
dispositive in subsequent adjudications.127 
If the issue is identical and was previously litigated, courts then consider 
whether a change of fact or law has occurred that is sufficient to defeat 
collateral estoppel.128  Generally speaking, the courts give regulatory 
agencies deference in claiming a change in circumstance is sufficient to 
defeat collateral estoppel.129  This is unremarkable, given that it is a well-
established principle of administrative law that agencies may regulate and 
announce new regulations using any method at their disposal, including 
adjudications.130  In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,131 the Court held that an 
administrative agency could craft a regulation through adjudication, even in 
the absence of a legislative change or formal rulemaking.132  An agency 
 
 121. See Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 122. See id.; see also Duvall, 436 F.3d at 391 (holding that collateral estoppel is not 
applicable when there is “a material intervening change in governing law or the burden of 
persuasion”); Thomas, 805 F.2d at 185 (“At no time should an agency be estopped from 
using its increased expertise.”). 
 123. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 124. See Mugomoke, 2014 WL 4472743, at *6–7. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 571–72; Office of Workers’ Comp. v. Saulsberry, 887 
F.2d 667, 667–68 (6th Cir. 1989); Dvareckas v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 804 F.2d 
770, 771 (1st Cir. 1986). 
 127. See cases cited supra note 126. 
 128. See, e.g., Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 572 (noting that collateral estoppel is only 
appropriate if the relevant legal standard is unchanged); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d 18, 21–23 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that a difference in 
burden of proof or decisional law could defeat the application of collateral estoppel); 
Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 178, 184–85 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that increased agency 
expertise and information could defeat collateral estoppel). 
 129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 130. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947) (“[T]he choice made 
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies 
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”). 
 131. 322 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 132. Id. at 202–03. 
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could approve of a certain practice in one adjudication and withdraw that 
approval in a subsequent adjudication.133 
Reconciling this agency discretion with the application of collateral 
estoppel has caused courts some trouble.  For instance, compare Amrollah 
v. Napolitano with Michigan v. Thomas.134  In Amrollah, a petitioner who 
had previously been granted asylum was denied permanent residency.135  In 
granting the petitioner’s request for asylum, USCIS determined that he had 
not supported terrorism.136  Between his grant of asylum and his application 
for residency, however, the 9/11 attacks occurred, and USCIS expanded its 
definition of “supporting terrorism.”  This, along with the shift in public 
policy toward increased security, was the basis of the denial of Amrollah’s 
permanent resident status.137  The Fifth Circuit reversed USCIS, noting that 
the underlying facts were the same and the legal standard for “supporting 
terrorism” had not changed sufficiently to justify the reversal of the asylum 
decision.138 
In Thomas, the EPA refused to approve Michigan’s proposed emissions 
rules, despite previously approving almost identical ones proposed by other 
states.139  Like USCIS in Amrollah, on appeal to the circuit court, the EPA 
argued that a change in the scope of a definition justified its decision.140  
The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA was not collaterally estopped from 
holding Michigan to higher emissions standards.141  Thus, in the absence of 
a Supreme Court determination, courts have been unable to provide clear 
guidance on when an agency is collaterally estopped by its previous 
decision.142 
2.  Overlapping Jurisdiction Between Agencies 
Courts also have confronted collateral estoppel issues when parties in an 
agency adjudication seek to enforce collateral estoppel based on the 
adjudication of another agency.143  These situations occur primarily when 
 
 133. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).  Agencies may 
change their rules to adapt to changing circumstances and promulgate these changes through 
administrative adjudications. See id. 
 134. 805 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 135. Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 569 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 136. Id. at 570. 
 137. Id. at 571–72. 
 138. Id. at 573. See generally supra INTRODUCTION (recounting the case in detail and 
noting the dramatic geopolitical changes that occurred between Amrollah’s asylum request 
and his permanent residency petition). 
 139. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 185. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. This conflict is symptomatic of a larger tension between collateral estoppel and 
administrative law, which will be discussed infra Part IV.A.2. 
 143. See Crowley v. United States, 398 F.3d 1329, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., 
concurring); Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1986); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. 
FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1979); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 894 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
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agencies have overlapping jurisdiction.144  Interagency collateral estoppel is 
more complex, as it occurs across a wider variety of situations.145  It also 
has the potential to present a problem if one or both adjudicating agencies 
claim their determination is entitled to Chevron deference.146 
Though the facts of the disputes about the application of interagency 
collateral estoppel vary much more widely, the legal arguments that the 
agencies present to courts tend to be recurring.  As in intra-agency 
applications of collateral estoppel, courts consider the nature of the 
proceedings in which the issue was determined and whether the issue to be 
determined is the same in both adjudications.147  Similarly, courts also 
consider whether changes in known facts or law are sufficient to defeat 
collateral estoppel.148  However, when deciding to apply collateral estoppel 
across agencies, courts also are attentive to the differences in purpose and 
expertise of the agencies involved.149 
For instance, in Porter & Dietsch, Inc., v. FTC,150 Porter & Dietsch 
argued that an adverse decision by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
was estoppped by an earlier Postal Service decision that held the marketing 
for Porter & Dietsch’s product did not contain fraudulent claims.151  The 
Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed.152  The court noted numerous factors 
that militated against the application of collateral estoppel, finding that the 
FTC should not be prevented from using its increased subject matter 
expertise and that new information available to the FTC made the 
application of collateral estoppel inappropriate.153 
In Kramer v. Jenkins,154 the court allowed the Parole Commission to rely 
on an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) deficiency determination in denying a 
 
 144. See Crowley, 398 F.3d at 1342 (Dyk, J., concurring); Kramer, 803 F.2d at 901; 
Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 605 F.2d at 299; Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 894.  The cases deal with 
the overlapping jurisdictions of the Merit Systems Protection Board, the IRS, and the FTC, 
respectively. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101; Gersen, supra note 101. 
 145. It does, however, affect some agencies more than others.  In particular, the FTC is 
often a party to these disputes, though under widely varying circumstances. See Gersen, 
supra note 101, at 707, 709 n.91. 
 146. See infra notes 180–85 and accompanying text. 
 147. See, e.g., Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d 
18, 21–23 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that a difference in burden of proof or decisional law could 
defeat the application of collateral estoppel); Kairys v. INS, 981 F.2d 937, 939–40 (7th Cir. 
1992) (discussing the proceedings to which the INS could accord collateral estoppel effect). 
 148. See Kramer, 803 F.2d at 902 (expressing dissatisfaction that the IRS determination 
being given collateral estoppel effect might be factually incorrect). 
 149. See Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 605 F.2d at 300 (allowing the FTC to relitigate an issue 
on public policy grounds); Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 893–94 (Levethal, J., concurring) 
(discussing limitations on collateral estoppel based on the type and purpose of the agency 
proceeding). 
 150. 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 151. Id. at 299. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 300 (“[I]t deals with a body of knowledge . . . that is constantly increasing.  
The government is not precluded from subsequently relitigating . . . under these 
circumstances.”). 
 154. 803 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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prisoner parole.155  Arnold Kramer was convicted of failing to file income 
tax returns and sentenced to four years in prison.156  When he applied for 
parole, the Parole Commission relied on an IRS letter stating the amount of 
tax Kramer owed to determine that the seriousness of Kramer’s crime 
required him to serve at least thirty-six months of his sentence.157  Kramer 
appealed the decision, arguing that the Parole Commission had acted 
unconstitutionally by failing to give him an opportunity to challenge the 
IRS’s determination of his liability.158 
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, disagreed.159  He went 
further, stating that not only was the Parole Commission permitted to rely 
on the IRS’s determination, but that it was probably required to defer to the 
IRS’s expertise on the matter.160  Though the court relied on the same 
consideration of agency expertise as in Porter & Dietsch, this time the 
circuit court seemed to arrive at the opposite conclusion by not only 
permitting the use of collateral estoppel, but also implying that its use might 
be mandatory.161 
These decisions could be reconciled on the theory that the courts in each 
case simply were deferring to the agency to decide what effect the agency 
must give the determinations of another agency.162  Judge Easterbrook’s 
dicta at the end of Kramer, however, appears to indicate that he believes 
that agencies may be required to apply collateral estoppel from other 
agency determinations.163  Furthermore, in Kairys v. Immigration 
Naturalization Services,164 the Seventh Circuit noted that agency discretion 
in deciding when to apply collateral estoppel was limited, but declined to 
define those limits.165 
Other courts also have struggled to produce a clear standard for applying 
collateral estoppel across agencies.  In FTC v. Texaco, Inc.,166 the D.C. 
Circuit rejected Texaco’s assertion of collateral estoppel based on a Federal 
Power Commission (FPC) decision.167  Though it followed the pattern of 
 
 155. Id. at 901. 
 156. Id. at 897. 
 157. Id. at 898. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 902. 
 160. See id. at 901 (“Once one agency of the government makes a finding, the 
Constitution does not require that the finding be subject to collateral attack in another 
agency.  Quite the contrary, principles of administrative preclusion may bind agencies.”). 
 161. See id. 
 162. In both of these cases the courts ultimately end up endorsing the agency’s view on 
whether collateral estoppel should apply. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944) (holding courts should give special weight and deference to well-reasoned 
agency judgments). 
 163. See Kramer, 803 F.2d at 902. But see id. at 903 (expressing concern over the use of 
collateral estoppel stemming from an IRS determination that a court might overturn on 
review). 
 164. 981 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 165. See id. at 940 (noting the agency adjudicative body did not possess “a free-swinging, 
uncanalized discretion”). 
 166. 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 167. Id. at 885. 
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courts deferring to the agency position on collateral estoppel, the panel’s 
judges could not agree on why the FPC decision did not bind the FTC.168  
Arguably, the FPC had more subject matter expertise than the FTC, and in 
the opinion it is unclear whether the court relied more on procedural posture 
or substantive administrative law.169 
Additionally, even when an agency acts within its subject matter 
expertise, courts sometimes decline to show deference to the agency’s 
position on collateral estoppel.  In Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs,170 the First Circuit required the 
Department of Labor (DOL) to give collateral estoppel effect to a state 
agency’s workers’ compensation determination.171  Even though the court 
admitted federalism did not strictly require the application of collateral 
estoppel, as it might have in Elliot,172 the court held that “a federal agency 
is normally bound to respect findings by another agency acting within its 
competence.”173  The court then conducted the common law multi-factor 
collateral estoppel analysis and concluded that the DOL had erred and that 
collateral estoppel did apply.174  The court also rejected the idea that new 
information about the claimant’s medical condition defeated collateral 
estoppel, noting that even a decision that was clearly wrong in light of new 
information could be protected by collateral estoppel.175 
Thus, an examination of multiple cases across the circuits presents no 
clear rule about when collateral estoppel applies across administrative 
proceedings.176  Another aspect of the issue that courts have not addressed 
is what effect Chevron deference has on the application of collateral 
estoppel across agencies.177 
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,178 the 
Supreme Court held that courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute as long as the agency’s interpretation is 
permissible.179  When jurisdictions overlap, however, agencies sometimes 
propose conflicting interpretations of the same ambiguous statute, each 
 
 168. See Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1247–48. 
 169. See Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 880–81 (declining to consider the merits of a collateral 
estoppel defense because it was improper at that stage). 
 170. 125 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 171. Id. at 22–23. 
 172. Id. at 21.  In Elliot, the state agency’s decision had the issue-preclusive effect a state 
court would give it. See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 798–99 (1986). 
 173. Bath Iron Works, 125 F.3d at 21. 
 174. Id. at 22. 
 175. Id. at 22–23. 
 176. See id. at 22 (analyzing a claim using the common law collateral estoppel factors); 
Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1986) (comparing agency expertise and 
decision-making procedures); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299–300 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (considering agency expertise); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (comparing the nature of the agency proceedings). 
 177. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1203–06 (speculating on the effect 
overlapping agency jurisdictions will have on Chevron deference). 
 178. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 179. See id. at 843. 
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arguing their interpretation deserves Chevron deference.180  Collateral 
estoppel applies to matters of fact and law,181 and agency adjudicative 
determinations may contain statutory interpretation.182  This means that, if a 
court gives collateral estoppel effect to one agency’s statutory 
interpretation, it could preclude another agency from interpreting the 
ambiguous statute with the deference that it would usually enjoy under 
Chevron.183  The increasing number of agency adjudicative bodies and the 
proliferation of statutes, which are administered by multiple regulatory 
bodies with concurrent jurisdiction,184 increase the chances that the 
application of collateral estoppel across different agencies will require 
courts to address agencies’ conflicting statutory interpretations.185 
B.  The Ways in Which Agencies 
Currently Apply Collateral Estoppel 
The lack of consensus among the courts as to when collateral estoppel 
applies in administrative adjudications has not stopped agencies from 
developing their own methods of determining when collateral estoppel 
should apply.186  There are three types of rules agencies employ.  The first 
rule mirrors the common law collateral estoppel analysis and is generally 
applied by administrative law judges (ALJs) when considering the effect of 
prior adjudications by their own or another agency.187  The second type of 
rule is one of interagency deference and is applied when agencies defer to 
the subject matter expertise of another agency that has previously 
adjudicated an issue.188  The third type of rule is a rigid, per se rule used by 
an agency to determine what effect to give its own prior determinations.189  
Whichever rule they choose, however, agencies differ from courts by 
maintaining a much greater degree of discretion when deciding to allow or 
deny a previous administrative adjudication collateral estoppel effect.190 
The first way agencies apply collateral estoppel in their adjudications 
resembles the operations of the courts.  Agencies that have ALJs or various 
levels of appellate review often employ the common law test to determine 
when to apply collateral estoppel from their own or another agency’s prior 
adjudication.191  The Merits System Protection Board (MSPB), which 
 
 180. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 
148–50 (1991) (resolving a dispute in which an administrative adjudication’s interpretation 
of the statute conflicted with the Secretary of Labor’s prior interpretation). 
 181. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
 183. See, e.g., Martin, 499 U.S. at 148–50. 
 184. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 185. See Gersen, supra note 101, at 691–92. 
 186. See infra notes 191–201 and accompanying text. 
 187. See infra notes 191–95 and accompanying text. 
 188. See infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
 189. See infra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
 190. See infra notes 205–11 and accompanying text. 
 191. For examples of agency decisions by ALJs and appeal boards, see infra notes 192–
95. 
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reviews the decisions made by federal agencies to dismiss employees, 
regularly decides cases on the basis of collateral estoppel.192  In doing so, it 
explicitly invokes the same four-factor test used by the federal courts.193  It 
applies collateral estoppel both from its own decisions and the decisions of 
other federal agencies.194  Other agencies, as varied as the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
have found it appropriate to apply collateral estoppel on similar grounds.195 
The second way agencies apply collateral estoppel in their adjudications 
is less common and occurs when agencies defer to the expertise of another 
agency to decide a specific issue.196  Agencies can choose to rely on the 
prior adjudications of other agencies when the subject matter presented is 
complex or outside their scope of expertise.197  The actions of the Parole 
Commission in Kramer fit this model.198 
The last way agencies apply collateral estoppel in their adjudications is 
through per se rules governing which proceedings are entitled to collateral 
estoppel effect.199  The SEC, for instance, considers that pleas in criminal 
cases have collateral estoppel effect.200  By contrast, USCIS has rules that 
say that the granting of certain types of petitions do not have collateral 
estoppel effect on subsequent adjudications.201 
 
 192. See, e.g., Lee v. U.S. Postal Service, AT-0752-12-0618-B-1, 2014 WL 5326062 
(M.S.P.B. Aug. 13, 2015); Greer v. U.S. Air Force, DA-0752-15-0324-I-1, 2015 WL 
4877902 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 8, 2015); Baseden v. Navy, DC-3443-15-0743-I-1, 2015 WL 
4712165, (M.S.P.B. Jul. 31, 2015); Payer v. Dep’t of the Army, 19 M.S.P.R. 534, 536–38 
(M.S.P.B. 1984). 
 193. See, e.g., Lee, 2014 WL 5326062 (“[C]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is 
appropriate when (1) an issue is identical to that involved in the prior action, (2) the issue 
was actually litigated in the prior action, (3) the determination on the issue in the prior action 
was necessary to the resulting judgment, and (4) the party precluded was fully represented in 
the prior action.” (citation omitted)). 
 194. See id. (holding jurisdictional determination in previous appeal collaterally estopped 
appellant in subsequent appeal); Payer, 19 M.S.P.R. at 537 (applying collateral estoppel 
from a previous Department of the Army pay increase determination). 
 195. See, e.g., Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., CFTC No. 98-R095, 1999 WL 325337, at *35 
(May 20, 1999) (reversing the ALJ for failing to apply collateral estoppel); In re Tex. Utils. 
Generating Co., 18 N.R.C. 36, 37–38 (1983) (holding DOL decision had a collateral estoppel 
effect). 
 196. See, e.g., In re Hanover House, Postal Service Nos. 2/143 & 2/149 (1975) (relying in 
part on findings of fact made by the FTC to determine whether information contained in 
mailing was false). 
 197. See, e.g., Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting a passage 
showing that the Parole Commission relied on IRS findings). 
 198. See id. 
 199. Per se rules do not invoke a balancing test, but simply specify situations in which 
collateral estoppel applies. See generally Brown, supra note 32 (explaining the concept of 
per se rules for collateral estoppel). 
 200. See, e.g., In re Michael Lapp, Exchange Act Release No. 591, 72 SEC Docket 97, 
98–99 (Mar. 29, 2000) (granting criminal plea collateral estoppel effect). But see SEC v. 
Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 306–07 (2d. Cir. 1999) (preventing the SEC from 
giving sentencing hearings collateral estoppel effect). 
 201. See Denials, Appeals, and Precedent Decisions, 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) (2012); In re 
[Identifying Information Redacted], 2012 WL 8526897, at *5 (USCIS Dec. 7, 2012) 
(denying collateral estoppel effect to the grant of a petition for a family member). 
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Whichever reasoning they use, agencies generally invoke collateral 
estoppel when they are faced with repeated proceedings against private 
parties and when relitigating the issue is unnecessary because a record on 
which the agency can make a decision has been developed in a prior 
adjudication.202  This parallels the concerns of courts when they apply 
collateral estoppel to promote judicial economy and finality between 
parties.203  Courts reserve broad discretion in deciding whether to apply 
collateral estoppel.204  Agencies, however, claim the power to abrogate 
collateral estoppel altogether when it no longer serves the agencies’ policy 
purposes.205 
Agencies are careful to maintain that collateral estoppel may not apply in 
their adjudications even if previous practice would indicate otherwise.206  
This reflects a principle of administrative law, which requires that an 
agency maintain flexibility in decision making.207  The decisions of the 
courts in Porter & Dietsch, Thomas, and Duvall v. Attorney General208 
endorse this line of reasoning by relying on the agency’s interest in 
improving its expertise, developing its regulations, and achieving 
Congress’s policy goals.209  In all of these cases, the common law analysis 
probably would have weighed in favor of applying collateral estoppel.210  
The courts reviewing the agency decisions in these cases recognized that 
considerations of administrative law required that agencies be given more 
leeway and not be so rigidly bound by past decisions.211 
 
 202. See, e.g., Lee v. U.S. Postal Service, AT-0752-12-0618-B-1, 2014 WL 5326062 
(M.S.P.B. Aug. 13, 2015) (applying collateral estoppel to prevent the matter from being 
litigated for a third time); In re Tex. Utils. Generating Co., 18 N.R.C. 36, 37–38 (1983) 
(holding the previously conducted DOL fact finding process was sufficient to have collateral 
estoppel effect). 
 203. See supra note 103. 
 204. See supra note 27. 
 205. See, e.g., supra note 201; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(4) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1982) (noting as an exception to the general rule that agencies may relitigate issues 
when invocation of collateral estoppel is inconsistent with legislative policy). 
 206. For instance, the MSPB decisions recognizing collateral estoppel carry a heading 
disclaiming their precedential value. See Lee, 2014 WL 5326062.  USCIS also specifically 
denies that its use of collateral estoppel in unpublished decisions can support its use in other 
cases. See In re Petitioner [Identifying Information Redacted], 2015 WL 4385367, at *9 
(USCIS June 23, 2015) (noting that “unpublished decisions are not . . . binding”). 
 207. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947) (“[T]he agency must 
retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is 
to be effective.”). 
 208. 436 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 209. See Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 390–91 (3d Cir. 2006); Michigan v. 
Thomas, 805 F.2d 178, 179–80 (6th Cir. 1986); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 
299–300 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 210. For instance, in Duvall, USCIS was allowed to relitigate an issue after government 
error resulted in an outcome that was clearly erroneous (the USCIS attorney at the initial 
deportation hearing failed to present evidence showing Duvall, a Jamaican national, was an 
alien). Duvall, 436 F.3d at 383–84, 391.  In United States v. Moser, the Court held that 
collateral estoppel prevented the government from relitigating after an unappealed legal error 
led to a clearly erroneous outcome. 266 U.S. 236, 241–42 (1924). 
 211. See supra note 209. 
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III.  THREE MODELS FOR APPLYING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS 
Part III explores three analytic frameworks for determining when 
administrative adjudications have collateral estoppel effect on subsequent 
adjudications.  Part III.A examines the Court’s reasoning in B & B 
Hardware and discusses the applicability of this analysis in administrative 
adjudications.  This view flows from the generally held assumption among 
commentators that whatever has the power to bind a federal court can bind 
a federal agency.212  Therefore, any agency decision that would have 
collateral estoppel effect in federal court under the B & B Hardware 
analysis would also collaterally estop parties in subsequent administrative 
adjudications.213 
Part III.B considers a second approach, which rejects the case-by-case 
analysis in favor of per se rules.  These rules would explicitly determine 
when an agency adjudication would have collateral estoppel effect in 
subsequent agency adjudications.214  Commentators who are dissatisfied by 
the uncertainty in the application of collateral estoppel created by courts’ 
reliance on multifactor tests often have advocated this view.215 
Part III.C discusses the third approach, which is to allow each agency to 
decide which adjudicative determinations it will recognize as giving rise to 
collateral estoppel.  This approach relies on current administrative and 
regulatory mechanisms to ensure that agency decisions are fair.  It also 
relies on interagency cooperation mechanisms to ensure that agency 
findings are consistent with one another, with courts intervening only as 
referees of last resort in case of an intractable disagreement between 
agencies.216 
A.  The B & B Hardware Approach 
This approach creates one standard for the application of collateral 
estoppel in federal proceedings.  It applies the two-step B & B Hardware 
analysis to determine the collateral estoppel effect of administrative 
determinations in subsequent administrative adjudications.  Part III.A.1 
describes the framework, and Part III.A.2 discusses its benefits and 
drawbacks. 
1.  B & B Hardware Applied to Administrative Adjudications 
After the Utah Construction Court suggested that administrative 
adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in court, courts and 
commentators assumed that this also meant that administrative 
adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in other administrative 
 
 212. See infra notes 217–23 and accompanying text. 
 213. See infra notes 224–31 and accompanying text. 
 214. See infra notes 274–77 and accompanying text. 
 215. See infra notes 262–73 and accompanying text. 
 216. See infra Part III.C. 
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adjudications.217  Administrative Collateral Estoppel:  The Case of the 
Subpoenas was one of the early academic considerations of how courts 
should apply collateral estoppel in the administrative context.218  It 
examined the wide divergence of concurring and dissenting opinions 
expressed by the D.C. Circuit in Texaco and dealt with the issue of whether 
Utah Construction authorized the use of collateral estoppel in 
administrative adjudications summarily, determining that it did by 
implication.219  Subsequent academic works, including the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments, also contained this assumption.220 
The Court endorsed this view indirectly in Astoria by holding that, when 
an administrative determination is not binding on a federal agency, it cannot 
be binding on a federal court.221  This seemed to imply a congruity between 
an administrative agency’s adjudicatory power to bind courts and its power 
to bind other agencies.222  If this implied congruity is extended, B & B 
Hardware can be used to govern the use of collateral estoppel in 
administrative adjudications.223 
Under B & B Hardware, courts and agencies would use a two-step 
analysis.  They would first determine whether an agency’s adjudicative 
determinations were entitled to collateral estoppel effect by examining the 
statutory scheme.224  Then courts would determine if collateral estoppel 
was appropriate in the specific situation using a common law analysis.225  
The First Circuit’s reasoning in Bath Iron Works neatly conforms to this 
template.226  In that case, the court first examined the statutory scheme and 
discussed whether decisions made under the Longshoreman’s Act had to be 
made de novo.227  After the court determined that the Maine Workers’ 
Compensation Commission had the power to make issue-preclusive 
determinations, it applied a common law collateral estoppel analysis.228 
 
 217. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1982) 
(implying collateral estoppel between administrative adjudications is the default rule by 
stating the exceptions). 
 218. See Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1247. 
 219. See id. at 1248–49. 
 220. See supra note 217. 
 221. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110 (1991) (“What 
does not preclude a federal agency cannot preclude a federal court . . . .”). 
 222. See id. 
 223. See Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis:  Justices Unsettled in Trademark Preclusion 
Dispute, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 25, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/ 
opinion-analysis-justices-unsettled-in-trademark-preclusion-dispute/ (noting that the case 
can be used as a “compendium” of modern preclusion rules with wide applicability) 
[https://perma.cc/2E8M-C6CS]. 
 224. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303–04 (2015). 
 225. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 226. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d 18, 20–
23 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 227. See id. at 21. 
 228. See id.  After a brief discussion of the complexities involved in determining whether 
a state administrative agency decision could have collateral estoppel effect in a federal 
agency’s adjudication, the court noted the appellee was seeking to “defend the result on 
narrower and more conventional grounds,” that is, attempting to defeat collateral estoppel by 
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Agency application of collateral estoppel is sometimes similar to the B & 
B Hardware two-step analysis.229  Agencies often consider the statutory 
and regulatory scheme when deciding which adjudicative decisions give 
rise to collateral estoppel.230  Agencies, and especially their administrative 
appeals boards, also regularly apply common law collateral estoppel 
factors.231 
Finally, application of the B & B Hardware analysis could help courts 
resolve interagency conflicts involving statutory interpretation under 
Chevron.  The first step of the B & B Hardware analysis requires the court 
(or adjudicative body) to consider the statutory scheme.232  When there is a 
Chevron conflict, courts similarly look to the statutory scheme to try to 
determine which agency deserves greater deference.233  When an agency 
interprets a statute of general applicability, such as the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), courts do not grant Chevron deference.234  Courts 
also deny agencies Chevron deference when they interpret statutes that are 
primarily the domain of another agency.235 
Applying these concepts to the B & B Hardware analysis, courts could 
decline to accord collateral estoppel to agency findings that rely on 
interpretations of general statutes, as such statutes fail to demonstrate 
congressional intent to invest the agency with the presumption of 
adjudicative authority.236  Similarly, when both agencies are invested with 
adjudicative authority, the court could engage in an analysis to determine 
which agency is primarily responsible for conducting adjudications under 
the statute.237  If neither of these analyses clearly favored one agency over 
the other, courts could continue with the common law portion of the B & B 
Hardware analysis.238  If the agency decisions met the common law 
 
arguing that the decisional law was different in the two proceedings. Id.; see also supra notes 
171–75 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra Part II.B (examining the ways in which agencies apply collateral 
estoppel). 
 230. See In re Petitioner [Identifying Information Redacted], 2015 WL 4385367, at *9 
(USCIS June 23, 2015) (rejecting a collateral estoppel argument due to the multistep nature 
of immigration proceedings); see also Mugomoke v. Hazuda, No. 13-cv-00984-KJM-KJN, 
2014 WL 4472743, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2014) (endorsing USCIS’s position). 
 231. See, e.g., supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra Part I.B. 
 233. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151–55 
(considering the structure of the statutory scheme). 
 234. See Prof’l Reactor Operator Soc’y v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 939 F.2d 1047, 
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding there is no Chevron deference when an agency interprets the 
APA). 
 235. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–69 (2006) (denying Chevron deference 
to the Attorney General when the FDA was primarily authorized to administer the statute); 
Gersen, supra note 101, at 714–15; Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping 
Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 206–07; Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 893 (2001). 
 236. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text (listing case law requiring legislative 
authority for agency adjudications to have collateral estoppel effect). 
 237. See Gersen, supra note 101, at 714–15. 
 238. See supra Part I.B.3 (explaining the steps of the B & B Hardware analysis). 
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standard for the application of collateral estoppel, the court would settle the 
conflict in favor of the agency who adjudicated first.239 
2.  Benefits and Drawbacks of the B & B Hardware Analysis 
The B & B Hardware approach could increase the predictability with 
which collateral estoppel is applied while still allowing the courts the 
flexibility of an equitable balancing test.240  Given the growth of the 
administrative state and proliferation of different types of administrative 
proceedings, a common complaint is that parties are often unsure how 
vigorously to contest adverse administrative determinations.241  The 
consequences of the actual administrative decision may be minor but could 
have major legal consequences if given collateral estoppel effect.242  The 
failure of courts to develop consistent lines of reasoning risks making the 
application of collateral estoppel appear arbitrary.243  The application of the 
B & B Hardware rule, with its clear analytic steps, could go a long way to 
curing this defect.244 
There are two possible drawbacks to using B & B Hardware to make 
collateral estoppel determinations in administrative adjudications.  The first 
is that, as a rule designed to be used in courts, it fails to take into account 
the variety of procedures in which agencies make their decisions.245  
Administrative determinations made in less formal proceedings that are not 
procedurally rigorous enough to be given collateral estoppel effect in 
federal court would also not be given collateral estoppel effect in other 
similarly informal adjudications.246  A formal test like B & B Hardware 
could place limits on agencies’ ability to rely on each other’s expertise.247  
This means that B & B Hardware could be underinclusive.248  It could also 
be overinclusive, by forcing agencies to recognize the collateral estoppel 
 
 239. This method of settling interagency disputes could have the salutary effect of 
incentivizing agencies to act promptly to issue and clarify rules. 
 240. But see Levine, supra note 26, at 449–50 (arguing that collateral estoppel balancing 
tests are inherently unpredictable). 
 241. See id. at 435–36. 
 242. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 243. See Levine, supra note 26, at 449–50 (arguing that an unpredictable rule is worse 
than no rule). 
 244. See id. at 453–54 (noting the possibility of improving the application of collateral 
estoppel with a detailed balancing test). 
 245. See, e.g., Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1260 (noting that agencies have reclassified 
proceedings as being “adjudicative” or “nonadjudicative” in order to defeat the use of 
collateral estoppel). 
 246. See supra notes 220–23 and accompanying text (supporting the assumption of 
congruity between federal court and agency use of collateral estoppel). 
 247. See, e.g., Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting formal 
requirements on collateral estoppel where one agency relies on another’s expertise). 
 248. That is, it could be used to deny collateral estoppel effect to determinations that 
policy considerations suggest should be given collateral estoppel effect.  Courts sometimes 
use this analysis to examine procedural due process claims. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, 
Overinclusion and Underinclusion:  A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447, 448 (1989) 
(explaining the concepts of overinclusion and underinclusion and their common uses in legal 
reasoning). 
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effect of prior procedurally sufficient adjudications, which would deprive 
agencies of the discretion to alter their positions and relitigate in the 
interests of public policy.249 
Another objection is that structure of the dispute in B & B Hardware is 
different from the structure of the disputes in other administrative collateral 
estoppel cases.250  B & B Hardware is a case between two private 
parties,251 as is Astoria.252  Utah Construction and Elliot have 
governmental bodies as one of the parties, but in neither case are the 
governmental bodies the adjudicative agencies whose decisions are in 
question.253  The Court’s reasoning in B & B Hardware is focused on the 
rights and expectations of the private parties and their need for finality on 
issues.254 
However, in every case in which the courts are asked to compel or 
prevent an agency’s application of collateral estoppel, the adjudicatory body 
is a party to the litigation.255  Often times both parties are repeat players 
who are bound by statute or regulatory scheme to revisit the same issues 
periodically, whether or not collateral estoppel is applied.256  This means 
that much of the Court’s reasoning in B & B Hardware may not be relevant 
to the application of collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications.257 
B.  Per Se Rules Governing the Use of Collateral Estoppel 
An alternative to B & B Hardware, or indeed any balancing test or 
multifactor analysis, is a per se rule.  This section considers the proposals of 
 
 249. See Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299–300 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding 
public policy goals can override collateral estoppel); Isaac N. Groner & Herman Sternstein, 
Res Judicata in Federal Administrative Law, 39 IOWA L. REV. 300, 312 (1954) (arguing that 
the Food and Drug Administration should not be collaterally estopped by prior agency 
adjudications). 
 250. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316–17 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (distinguishing public and private rights when applying collateral 
estoppel from an administrative adjudication); Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1258–59, 1262 
(distinguishing the interests of private parties as opposed to agencies in the application of 
collateral estoppel). 
 251. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1299. 
 252. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 106 (1991). 
 253. In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., the contracting agency was the 
Atomic Energy Commission, and the adjudicating agency was the Advisory Board of 
Contract Appeals. 384 U.S. 394, 400 (1966).  In University of Tennessee v. Elliot, the 
University of Tennessee was sued in federal court. 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986). 
 254. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1302–03. 
 255. See supra Part II.A.  When a petitioner asks for judicial review of an agency’s use or 
denial of collateral estoppel in an adjudication, the agency (or one of its officials) appears as 
an adverse party to defend its decision. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C 
§§ 701–706 (2012). 
 256. See, e.g., Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 384–85 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting an alien 
had appeared in multiple immigration proceedings over fifteen years); Michigan v. Thomas, 
805 F.2d 176, 179–80 (6th Cir. 1986) (reading the statutory provision to require periodic 
reformulation of the rule); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299–300 (7th Cir. 
1979) (considering at least three prior administrative adjudications that had been conducted 
about the marketing of the same type of product). 
 257. See, e.g., B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1316–17 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court’s reasoning should only apply to the public rights of private parties). 
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commentators who have argued that the application of collateral estoppel in 
administrative adjudications should be governed by per se rules.  Part 
III.B.1 considers whether, in the administrative context, collateral 
estoppel’s equitable balancing test should be replaced with a set of 
objective requirements designed to curb agency and judicial discretion and 
make the collateral estoppel effect of administrative adjudications more 
predictable.258  Part III.B.2 considers potential benefits and limitations of 
this approach while examining a more flexible way to apply per se rules. 
1.  Adoption of Formal Per Se Rules for Collateral Estoppel 
In a note entitled Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative Agency 
Determinations:  Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, David 
Brown argues that the increased application of collateral estoppel from 
administrative adjudications increases the risk of unfairness and 
inefficiency in subsequent administrative and judicial proceedings.259  This 
risk primarily stems from the uncertainty surrounding the factors that courts 
consider when deciding to give an agency determination collateral estoppel 
effect.260  Brown proposes to cure this defect by creating a formal checklist 
that an administrative adjudication must meet in order for its determinations 
to have collateral estoppel effect.261 
Brown first discusses the increased application of collateral estoppel in 
administrative adjudications in the wake of Utah Construction and its 
progeny.262  He then examines the factors that could make collateral 
estoppel appropriate as found by the Court in Utah Construction.263  Brown 
argues that the requirements that the agency act in its judicial capacity and 
that adjudication give the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate have 
been subject to a wide range of interpretations.264 
Brown contends this uncertainty has two adverse effects.265  First, it 
creates litigation inefficiencies in both administrative adjudications and 
federal courts.266  Parties are unsure which administrative adjudications will 
have collateral estoppel effect and so have an incentive to litigate 
vigorously in otherwise low stakes administrative proceedings in order to 
protect themselves from an adverse decision that could be consequential in 
a future dispute.267  Additionally, because parties cannot be certain whether 
an administrative adjudication will have collateral estoppel effect, the losing 
 
 258. See Brown, supra note 32, at 818. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 819. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 827–28. 
 263. Id.  Brown identifies four factors:  the agency must have jurisdiction, be acting in a 
judicial capacity, properly resolve the issue, and give the parties a fair chance to litigate. Id. 
 264. Id. at 830–31. 
 265. Id. at 819. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 838–39. 
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party has an incentive to try to relitigate the issue in court, if only to find 
out whether it is estopped from doing so.268 
The second concern Brown raises is unfairness.269  He argues that the 
procedural variety of agency adjudicatory procedures, and the fact that 
regulatory agencies often act as parties rather than neutral arbitrators,270 
creates the risk that parties could be unfairly deprived of their chance to 
truly contest the issue.271  Administrative adjudications have their own 
rules, which often limit the amount of evidence parties can present, the 
manner in which they can present it, and their ability to be represented by 
counsel.272  Giving collateral estoppel effect to such a proceeding 
effectively would nullify the greater rights, protections, and opportunity to 
litigate that might be provided by a court or subsequent adjudicatory 
body.273 
Brown proposes to minimize these problems through a seven-point 
checklist that administrative adjudications would have to meet for their 
determinations to be entitled to collateral estoppel effect.274  These include 
the right to counsel and to cross-examine witnesses.275  Essentially, under 
Brown’s proposal, only court-like proceedings would be accorded collateral 
estoppel effect.276  This would ensure both uniformity and fairness across 
all administrative proceedings.277 
2.  The Benefits and Limitations of Per Se Rules 
Per se rules would ensure both uniformity and fairness across all 
administrative proceedings.278  Litigants would know if any given 
adjudication has collateral estoppel effect and be able to adjust their 
behavior accordingly, eliminating the inefficiency of overlitigation and the 
unfairness of underlitigation.279  However, Brown’s specific proposals were 
designed with courts in mind, and only secondary consideration was given 
to collateral estoppel between administrative adjudications.280  As with the 
B & B Hardware approach, Brown’s proposals are not tailored to specific 
administrative adjudications and carry the risk of being underinclusive.281  
The procedural formality they require for a decision to have collateral 
estoppel effect would also be burdensome on agency decision making.282 
 
 268. Id. at 839. 
 269. Id. at 842. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 842–43. 
 272. Id. at 844–45. 
 273. See id. at 845. 
 274. Id. at 848. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 851. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id. 
 279. See id. at 838–39. 
 280. See id. at 848–49. 
 281. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text (discussing underinclusiveness). 
 282. See Brown, supra note 32, at 850–51 (noting that per se rules may decrease 
efficiency). 
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A more narrowly tailored version of the per se rules seeks to solve these 
problems.283  In a note entitled Preclusion Confusion:  A Call for Per Se 
Rules Preventing the Application of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made 
in Nontraditional Litigation, Brian Levine concurs with Brown about the 
cost of uncertainty inherent in the balancing test approach to collateral 
estoppel in administrative adjudications.284  However, Levine dismisses the 
possibility of developing a single, comprehensive per se rule like the one 
proposed by Brown.285  He believes that, given the variety on 
administrative and other proceedings, a comprehensive proposal for per se 
prohibitions is virtually impossible.286  Levine instead argues that, in 
litigation where the benefits of predictability are high and the burden on 
courts of allowing relitigation of the issues is low, courts should develop 
per se rules limiting the collateral estoppel effect of previous administrative 
adjudications.287  For instance, Levine argues in favor of a per se rule that 
administrative adjudications in unemployment claims do not give rise to 
collateral estoppel.288 
Levine’s per se rules have the benefit of providing increased 
predictability while still allowing agencies some flexibility.289  Some 
agencies already have per se rules similar to the type he proposes.290  
However, a potential drawback of these narrowly tailored prohibitions is the 
complexity of the system they would create.291  Levine’s approach also 
combines a balancing test with per se rules, and it is unclear whether this 
would really create more certainty.292 
C.  Reasons for Giving Agencies the Discretion to Decide Which 
Administrative Adjudications Will Have Collateral Estoppel Effect 
The application of collateral estoppel is usually classified as an area of 
procedural, rather than substantive, law.293  Agencies have the discretion to 
choose which procedures they use, subject only to the requirements of the 
APA and their authorizing statute.294  Therefore, it would be consistent with 
administrative law for courts to defer to agency determinations about when 
administrative adjudications should be accorded collateral estoppel effect 
within and across agencies.295 
 
 283. See generally Levine, supra note 26. 
 284. Id. at 439–40. 
 285. Id. at 449. 
 286. Id. (“It would be impossible to evaluate every conceivable situation to which a per se 
prohibition may be appropriate . . . .”). 
 287. Id. at 463–66. 
 288. Id. at 465. 
 289. Id. at 463–66. 
 290. See supra Part II.B. 
 291. See Levine, supra note 26, at 453–54. 
 292. See id. 
 293. See, e.g., id. at 435 (labeling collateral estoppel as “an esoteric procedural doctrine”). 
 294. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 523–
24 (1978). 
 295. See Kairys v. INS, 981 F.2d 937, 939–40 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that “the main task 
of the reviewing court is to make sure that the tribunal actually exercised its discretion”). 
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There are, however, two major issues raised by allowing agencies the 
discretion to decide if and when to apply collateral estoppel.  The first is the 
concern that this will lead to uncertainty and unfairness among the parties 
that have to appear in administrative adjudications.296  The second is that 
allowing agencies the discretion to decide the extent to which they will 
apply collateral estoppel will lead to unresolved conflicts between 
agencies.297 
Regarding the first concern, different agencies applying different rules, 
with the discretion to change those rules, will exacerbate the unpredictable 
nature of collateral estoppel.298  However, agencies exercise their discretion 
to apply collateral estoppel most often by either applying the common law 
standard or formulating per se rules.299  If the agency employs the common 
law balancing test, which is similar to the one used by courts,300 the 
application of collateral estoppel is no more unpredictable than in court.301  
If they apply per se rules,302 collateral estoppel is more predictable in the 
agency setting than in court.303  Arguably, this makes collateral estoppel 
applied by agency discretion more predictable than that applied by 
courts.304 
When agencies do change the rules by which they apply collateral 
estoppel, they cannot act unconstrainedly.305  At a minimum, federal 
agency actions are reviewable for violations of due process under the U.S. 
Constitution and to ensure they are not “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or 
otherwise irrational under the APA.306  In Kramer, for instance, the court 
reviewed the Parole Commission’s use of collateral estoppel to ensure it 
met due process requirements.307  Agencies also are subject to other 
 
 296. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 848 (arguing, inter alia, that only agency 
decisions subject to judicial review should be given collateral estoppel effect). See supra 
Part III.B.1 for a full discussion of these concerns. 
 297. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101. 
 298. See Levine, supra note 26, at 449–53. 
 299. See supra Part II.B. 
 300. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text (listing examples of agencies 
applying the common law balancing test). 
 301. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (listing examples of agencies 
applying per se rules). 
 303. See Levine, supra note 26, at 436 (arguing that per se rules improve predictability). 
 304. See id. at 453 (arguing that the application of collateral estoppel is so unpredictable 
that any additional per se rule would simplify it). 
 305. An agency could not, for instance, give collateral estoppel effect to the findings of a 
court that had no jurisdiction. See Kairys v. INS, 981 F.2d 937, 939–40 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 306. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“The reviewing court shall—(1)  compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2)  hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A)  arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B)  contrary to constitutional right, 
power, privilege, or immunity; (C)  in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right; (D)  without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E)  unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this 
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F)  
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the 
reviewing court.”). 
 307. See Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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requirements that limit their discretion to apply collateral estoppel.308  The 
Sarbanes-Oxely Act,309 for instance, requires that administrative decisions 
made pursuant to it be given collateral estoppel effect.310  Similarly, certain 
Title VII311 issues adjudicated by the EEOC are binding in other agencies’ 
adjudications.312 
Agencies themselves also have an interest in acting in a rational and 
predictable manner.313  Agencies are subject to political control and 
oversight.314  An agency that acts in unpredictable ways or causes large 
amounts of uncertainty will draw criticism and find its actions curbed.315  
Even absent any other legal restraints, agencies tend to use their discretion 
to apply collateral estoppel in a predictable and equitable manner.316 
The other major concern is that agencies that share regulatory space will 
choose not to honor collateral estoppel from one another’s adjudications 
and cause parties to be subject to conflicting and inconsistent rulings.317  In 
practice, agencies have little incentive to, and rarely do, work directly 
against one another in this way.318  When they do disagree, there are 
safeguards in place to resolve the disputes.319 
Executive agencies320 operating in a shared regulatory space are subject 
to presidential control through the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs321 (OIRA).  They do not have the discretion to embark on 
diametrically opposed courses of action that could result in conflicting 
 
 308. See Kairys, 981 F.2d at 939–40 (holding that there are limits to agency discretion to 
apply collateral estoppel). 
 309. Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 310. See Tice v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 325 F. App’x 114, 121 (holding 
administrative determinations in claims brought under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are not 
subject to collateral attack). 
 311. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5b (2012). 
 312. See id. § 2000e-16. 
 313. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [an agency] 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements . . . .”). 
 314. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1173–74 (explaining tools that are 
available to Congress and the President to control agencies). 
 315. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfg. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 
34–43 (1983) (holding that after multiple sudden policy reversals, an agency policy was 
arbitrary and capricious). 
 316. Even critics of collateral estoppel admit that there are relatively few cases 
challenging its application by agencies. See Levine, supra note 26, at 450 (noting a lack of 
case law in this area). 
 317. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1146–48; Levine, supra note 26, at 460–
61. 
 318. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1155–56 (noting a recent increase in the 
use of interagency coordination tools). 
 319. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Improving Interagency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 11, 12–13 (listing various interagency 
coordination mechanisms). 
 320. An executive agency is one whose head serves at the pleasure of the President. See 
id. at 13; Gersen, supra note 101, at 704. 
 321. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1178–79. 
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adjudicative decisions.322  Independent agencies with concurrent 
jurisdictions often use interagency bodies to coordinate adjudicatory 
enforcement efforts.323  All agencies are incentivized to cooperate and 
honor one another’s adjudications, if only to increase the deference such 
proceedings are accorded by the courts.324 
Agencies with overlapping jurisdiction generally honor each other’s 
adjudicative findings or arrange that only one agency conduct 
administrative adjudications, while the other, for instance, engages in 
formal rulemaking.325  If all of these mechanisms fail, courts still can apply 
a primacy analysis to determine which agencies’ decisions are entitled to 
collateral estoppel effect.326  Therefore, granting agencies the discretion to 
decide when collateral estoppel applies in administrative adjudications is 
likely to produce decisions that are at least as consistent and predictable as 
those reached by the courts. 
IV.  CHOOSING A WAY TO APPLY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS 
The B & B Hardware approach, the per se rules approach, and the agency 
discretion approach of applying collateral estoppel each bring their own set 
of problems and concerns.327  Ultimately, however, this Note argues that 
courts should defer to agency discretion in applying collateral estoppel in 
administrative adjudications.  Part IV.A discusses the difficulties of 
applying the B & B Hardware analysis, including underinclusiveness, 
overinclusiveness, and the incongruity of its underlying reasoning with the 
purposes and goals of administrative adjudications.  Part IV.B demonstrates 
why neither broad nor narrow per se rules can create a workable system for 
applying collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications.  Finally, Part 
IV.C argues that courts should defer to agencies when applying collateral 
estoppel in administrative adjudications. 
A.  Problems with the B & B Hardware Analysis 
This section discusses why the problems that arise from using the B & B 
Hardware analysis in administrative adjudications make it an inappropriate 
standard for the application of collateral estoppel.  Part IV.A.1 explains that 
the B & B Hardware analysis is both underinclusive and overinclusive, 
excluding cases where collateral estoppel should probably apply while still 
 
 322. Id. See generally Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sep. 30, 1993) (“Each 
agency shall avoid regulations that are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative with its 
other regulations or those of other Federal agencies.”). 
 323. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1165–70 (describing joint policy and 
rulemaking procedures among independent agencies); see also Gersen, supra note 101, at 
696. 
 324. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1204–06 (“Yet even if courts apply 
existing standards of review, other things being equal, we expect strong agency coordination 
to produce decisions that will tend to attract greater judicial deference.”). 
 325. See, e.g., id. at 1150. 
 326. See id. at 1150 n.69. 
 327. See supra Part III.A.2, B.2, C. 
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applying collateral estoppel so broadly that it could impede basic 
administrative and regulatory functions in agency adjudications.  Part 
IV.A.2 examines the underlying problem, which is a tension between the 
policy reasons behind collateral estoppel and the structure of most 
regulatory schemes. 
1.  Underinclusiveness and Overinclusiveness 
A serious problem with using the B & B Hardware analysis in the 
administrative context is that its first step makes it underinclusive.  The 
requirement that the administrative body that made the initial determination 
be authorized by statute to make binding adjudications is justified when 
applying collateral estoppel in a judicial proceeding.328  However, it risks 
becoming needlessly burdensome in less formal administrative 
proceedings.329 
This issue is probably best illustrated in Kramer.  The Seventh Circuit 
allowed the Parole Commission to base its findings on the amount Kramer 
owed the government, contained in a letter from the IRS estimating his tax 
deficiency.330  This letter almost certainly would have failed to be accorded 
collateral estoppel effect under B & B Hardware, because the statutory 
scheme requires that the IRS finding be subject to collateral and direct 
attack in federal tax court.331  B & B Hardware, if applied to this case, 
would have required the Parole Commission to allow Kramer to relitigate 
his tax debt before the board and the board to render its own decision.332  
Results like this are inefficient not only because they require a duplication 
of effort but also because they prevent agencies from relying on the 
specialized knowledge and expertise of other agencies.333 
In order to avoid this problem when applying collateral estoppel, most 
agencies (and some courts) do not consider the absolute authority invested 
in the body that made the initial determination.334  Instead, they consider 
the relative similarity between the first proceeding and the subsequent 
proceeding in which collateral estoppel is asserted.335  In other words, it 
 
 328. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 330. Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 331. Id. at 902.  In Astoria, the Court found that, because Congress intended the agency 
finding to be subject to collateral attack in EEOC proceedings, it could not be given 
collateral estoppel effect in any federal forum. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying 
text. 
 332. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text (denying collateral estoppel effect to 
proceedings that are automatically reviewed). 
 333. See Kramer, 803 F.3d at 902 (“A decision by the IRS concerning the validity of such 
a claim is more likely to be correct than is a decision by the Parole Commission on the same 
subject.”). 
 334. See supra notes 97–98 (discussing the adjudicative authority prong of B & B 
Hardware). 
 335. See, e.g., Kramer, 803 F.3d at 901 (considering the IRS’s decision-making 
procedures); Mugomoke v. Hazuda, No. 13-cv-00984-KJM-KJN, 2014 WL 4472743, at *6 
(E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2014) (holding that an asylum interview was not procedurally equivalent 
to subsequent proceedings, and therefore its findings did not have collateral estoppel effect). 
2016] ADMINISTRATIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 2913 
should not be necessary for an administrative adjudication to be able to bind 
a court for it to bind another administrative adjudication.  It should be 
enough to determine that the two proceedings have a similar level of 
procedural formality and authority.336 
The B & B Hardware analysis is also overinclusive, as applied to 
agencies’ own past decisions.  The common law analysis, which is the 
second step of the B & B Hardware approach, could effectively prevent 
agencies from promulgating rules through adjudication.337  As the Court 
recognized in B & B Hardware, the application of collateral estoppel does 
not require that the issues presented be formally identical, but rather 
substantially similar, especially when the parties themselves are 
identical.338  Furthermore, even clear legal and factual errors, if not 
appealed, usually are not subject to collateral attack.339 
The common law version of collateral estoppel in B & B Hardware 
endorses the outcome of Amrollah rather than Duvall or Thomas.340  This 
outcome creates a conflict with the broader principle of administrative law 
enunciated in Chenery,341 as it would enable a party to prevent an agency 
from modifying a previously enunciated rule by invoking collateral 
estoppel.342  By effectively limiting the ways in which agencies can 
regulate, the robust collateral estoppel doctrine espoused in B & B 
Hardware not only would conflict with nearly seventy years of precedent, 
but also could significantly raise the cost and difficulty of regulating for 
administrative agencies, such as the SEC and the National Labor Relations 
Board, which use adjudicatory regulation to supplement their 
rulemaking.343 
2.  The Incompatible Policy Goals 
of Collateral Estoppel and Administrative Law 
The problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness inherent in 
the B & B Hardware analysis reflect a deeper tension between the policy 
concerns that have led courts to favor collateral estoppel and those that 
 
 336. See, e.g., Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d 
18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding it sufficient that both agency proceedings provided 
equivalent litigation opportunities). 
 337. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 338. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1306–07 (2015) 
(finding that minor variations in the issue did not defeat collateral estoppel); Bath Iron 
Works, 125 F.3d at 22–23 (holding that differences in burdens of proof did not defeat 
collateral estoppel when both parties had the opportunity to litigate). 
 339. See, e.g., United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 241–42 (1924); Bath Iron Works, 
125 F.3d at 23. 
 340. See supra notes 122, 130–42 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text (explaining the Chenery rule). 
 342. See, e.g., supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text (describing how USCIS was 
estopped from expanding the definition of “supporting terrorism”). 
 343. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 178, 179–80 (6th Cir. 
1986). 
2914 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
underpin much of administrative law.344  The difference in the structure of 
the disputes highlights the difference in policy considerations when 
applying collateral estoppel in court as opposed to an administrative 
adjudication.345 
In disputes between private parties, such as B & B Hardware and the line 
of cases that preceded it, a limited number of issues are implicated, and 
those same issues are unlikely to recur between the parties once settled.346  
Judicial economy and basic fairness are best served by ensuring that, once 
the parties have contested an issue in an appropriate forum, regardless of 
the exact nature of that forum, the losing party cannot waste time and 
money relitigating the issue.347  This need for finality is the underlying 
policy consideration that justifies all applications of collateral estoppel, 
including the use of collateral estoppel from administrative adjudications in 
federal court.348 
This underlying logic is not applicable when attempting to justify the 
application of collateral estoppel between administrative adjudications.  The 
adjudicatory body, as a party to the litigation,349 is interested not just in 
“winning” or achieving “repose,” but also in constructing a workable 
regulatory scheme in accordance with legislative intent.350  In many cases, 
this end is best served by preventing finality and allowing the relitigation of 
issues.351 
Cases in which the collateral estoppel from an administrative 
adjudication is applied in court are structurally different from cases in 
which collateral estoppel is applied between administrative 
adjudications.352  As a result, the fundamental policy considerations 
involved are different.  The B & B Hardware analysis, with its robust 
common law version of collateral estoppel,353 simply is not appropriate in 
an administrative context. 
 
 344. See Groner & Sternstein, supra note 249, at 312; see also Churchill Tabernacle v. 
FCC, 160 F.2d 244, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (allowing inconsistent Federal Communications 
Commission determinations after finding that common law collateral estoppel considerations 
did not apply). 
 345. See supra notes 249–57 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra note 250 (emphasizing the difference between public and private interest 
in finality). 
 347. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979). 
 348. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302–03 (2015). 
 349. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text (describing the procedural posture of 
judicial review of administrative collateral estoppel). 
 350. See Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 300 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that 
public policy concerns override the usual collateral estoppel considerations); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1982). 
 351. See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, 605 F.2d at 300; Groner & Sternstein, supra note 249, at 
312. 
 352. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 353. See supra Part I.B.3 (describing B & B Hardware’s endorsement of the common law 
collateral estoppel doctrine). 
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B.  Problems with Per Se Rules 
for Administrative Collateral Estoppel 
This section discusses how per se rules for collateral estoppel often can 
complicate, rather than simplify, the problems inherent in the balancing 
tests.  Part IV.B.1 argues that broad, formalistic rules, such as those 
proposed by Brown, would limit agency discretion in ways that are 
inconsistent with the current legal landscape and frustrate the purposes of 
administrative law.  Part IV.B.2 points out that narrow, ad hoc rules, such 
as those proposed by Levine, are in many ways worse and would actually 
increase uncertainty in administrative adjudications. 
1.  Problems with Broad Per Se Rules 
Broad, generally applicable prohibitions that rely on a formal set of rules, 
such as the ones proposed by Brown, are not appropriate when applying 
collateral estoppel across agencies.  Any set of formalistic determinations 
would also be both overinclusive and underinclusive354:  the sheer variety 
of agency proceedings defies the imposition of any objective standard, and 
any comparison of two administrative adjudications would involve a 
balancing test rather than a formal checklist.355 
Furthermore, the judicial imposition of a generally applicable formal rule 
would be an anomaly in administrative law because, within their statutory 
frameworks, agencies are given the discretion to determine their own 
decision-making procedures.356  The Supreme Court has consistently 
pushed back against lower courts that have attempted to impose formal 
requirements on agency procedures.357  A judicially created formal 
requirement that dictated the extent to which agencies could rely on prior 
administrative adjudications would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
Court’s jurisprudence.358 
2.  Problems with Narrow Per Se Rules 
Narrowly tailored per se prohibitions, such as those proposed by 
Levine,359 are even more problematic.  They would serve to complicate, 
rather than clarify, the application of collateral estoppel among agencies 
and only address when collateral estoppel would be prohibited rather than 
providing guidance as to when it would be allowed. 
 
 354. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 355. For this reason, when evaluating the constitutionality of agency procedures, courts 
compare the value of the interest at stake to the safeguards in place rather than using any 
formal checklist. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
 356. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text. 
 357. The most recent example is Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 
(2015), in which the Court unanimously reversed the D.C. Circuit for attempting to require 
formal procedures when agencies change their interpretation of a regulation. See id. at 1206. 
 358. See id. at 1207 (“Time and again, we have reiterated that the APA ‘sets forth the full 
extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for procedural correctness.’” 
(quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009))). 
 359. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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Levine himself acknowledges that his proposed analysis to determine 
when per se prohibitions on collateral estoppel are appropriate adds another 
balancing test to the ones courts already must consider when applying 
collateral estoppel.360  Furthermore, a per se prohibition would have to 
address to which types of administrative adjudications it applied, or it 
would risk being underinclusive.361  Given the sheer variety of 
administrative adjudications in which collateral estoppel can be invoked, 
even a single per se rule would be complex.362  This, combined with the 
fact that courts and agencies would certainly disagree about which per se 
prohibitions applied to which adjudications, would create a complex and 
unworkable system.363 
Finally, even after the adoption of per se prohibitions, there still would be 
administrative adjudications where the application of per se prohibitions 
would not be appropriate.364  In these cases, courts and agencies still would 
have defaulted to the common law balancing test to apply collateral 
estoppel.365  Thus, per se prohibitions would add layers of complexity and 
uncertainty to administrative collateral estoppel determinations by adding a 
new balancing test without actually replacing the current collateral estoppel 
balancing tests. 
C.  Courts Should Defer to Agencies 
When Reviewing the Application of Collateral Estoppel 
Courts already defer to agencies when they interpret statutes and engage 
in rulemaking.366  As long as they act within the boundaries and for the 
purposes established by the legislature, agencies have wide discretion.367  
This section argues that judicial constraints on agencies applying collateral 
estoppel are unnecessary and inconsistent with the larger body of 
administrative law.  It concludes that courts should defer to agency 
decisions when deciding whether a prior administrative adjudication has 
collateral estoppel effect on a present one. 
Agencies are already subject to a number of constraints, both legal and 
political.368  These prevent agencies from acting in ways that are arbitrary 
or grossly inconsistent.369  An agency decision to apply collateral estoppel 
from one adjudication to another adjudication is already bound by these 
 
 360. Levine, supra note 26, at 453. 
 361. See supra Part IV.A.1.  A per se rule would have to say something like “adjudication 
A has collateral estoppel effect on Adjudication B, but not on Adjudication C” in order to 
avoid the underinclusiveness problem. 
 362. See Levine, supra note 26, at 449; Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1259–61. 
 363. Levine himself acknowledges that his system would increase the frequency of 
inconsistent judgments. See Levine, supra note 26, at 460–63. 
 364. See id. at 462–63. 
 365. See id. 
 366. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing Chevron deference). 
 367. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text (describing the limits on agency 
discretion). 
 368. See supra Part III.C. 
 369. See supra Part III.C. 
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constraints.370  Additional constraints, such as the equitable balancing test 
contained in B & B Hardware or the judicially imposed per se rules 
advocated by some commentators, are largely unnecessary.371  They add 
additional layers of analysis that complicate an already complex area of the 
law, creating rather than solving anomalies and uncertainties.372 
Furthermore, agencies are created by the legislature, as are the limits of 
their discretion.373  Agencies’ power to make decisions that have collateral 
estoppel effect flows from the discretion granted to them by Congress.374  
The Supreme Court has consistently pushed back on courts’ attempts to 
limit agency discretion with judicially created or enforced limitations.375  
Where an agency has the power to adjudicate, therefore, it should have the 
discretion to apply collateral estoppel as it sees fit, subject only to 
legislative constraints.376 
Attempts to limit this discretion are inconsistent with other doctrines and 
policies of administrative law.377  For instance, requiring agencies to 
recognize the collateral estoppel effect of their own prior adjudications is 
inconsistent with agencies’ ability to interpret statutes and make rules 
through administrative adjudications.378  Constraining an agency to abide 
by the past determinations of it or another agency is against the policy of 
allowing agencies to have evolving standards that reflect growing expertise 
and changing conditions.379  On the other hand, preventing agencies from 
relying on the findings of prior adjudications could lead to unnecessary and 
wasteful litigation.380 
Courts should therefore defer to agencies when reviewing their use of 
collateral estoppel.  This approach lacks the doctrinal neatness of per se 
rules and the intuitive appeal of the extension of the B & B Hardware 
analysis.381  It is, however, the best way to ensure a flexible and equitable 
application of collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications and the 
only approach that is consistent with the broader principles of 
administrative law. 
CONCLUSION 
Collateral estoppel is an equitable common law doctrine that courts use 
to enforce repose between private parties once an issue has been litigated.  
The Supreme Court has expanded its use in federal court, granting collateral 
estoppel effect to determinations of fact and law made in administrative 
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adjudications.  However, requiring agencies to give or withhold collateral 
estoppel effect to prior administrative adjudications, either through B & B 
Hardware’s two-step analysis or per se rules, is inappropriate.  Rather, 
courts should defer to agency determinations when reviewing agency use of 
collateral estoppel.  Not only does this approach allow agencies the 
discretion and flexibility to apply their expertise and promote public 
welfare, it is the only approach that is compatible with the larger corpus of 
administrative law. 
